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This paper examines asset-price bubbles in an economy where a 
nondepletable asset (e.g., land) can provide transaction services, using a 
variant of the cash-in-advance model. 
When a landowner can borrow money immediately using land as 
collateral, one can say that land essentially provides a transaction service. 
The transaction services that such an asset can provide increase as 
its price rises, since the asset owner can borrow more money against the 
asset's increased value.   
Thus an asset-price bubble can emerge due to the externality of 
self-reference, wherein the asset price reflects the transaction services that it 
can provide, while the amount of the transaction services reflects the asset 
price. 
If the collateral ratio of the asset (θ) and money supply (m) are not 
very large, a steady state equilibrium exists where the asset price has a 
bubble component and resource allocation is inefficient; if θand/or  m 
become large, the bubble component of the asset price vanishes and the 
equilibrium allocation becomes efficient. 
The paper shows that in the case where the equilibrium concept is 
relaxed to allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, an 
equilibrium exists where a bubble develops temporarily and eventually 
bursts. 
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Abstract
This paper examines asset-price bubbles in an economy where a nondepletable
asset (e.g., land) can provide transaction services, using a variant of the cash-in-
advance model. When a landowner can borrow money immediately using land as
collateral, one can say that land essentially provides a transaction service. The trans-
action services that such an asset can provide increase as its price rises, since the
asset owner can borrow more money against the asset’s increased value. Thus an
asset-price bubble can emerge due to the externality of self-reference,w h e r e i nt h ea s -
set price reﬂects the transaction services that it can provide, while the amount of the
transaction services reﬂects the asset price. If the collateral ratio of the asset (θ)a n d
money supply (m) are not very large, a steady state equilibrium exists where the as-
set price has a bubble component and resource allocation is ineﬃcient; if θ and/or m
become large, the bubble component of the asset price vanishes and the equilibrium
allocation becomes eﬃcient. The paper shows that in the case where the equilibrium
∗I am grateful to Toni Braun and anonymous referees for helpful comments. All remaining errors are
mine.
1concept is relaxed to allow for sticky prices and a temporary supply-demand gap, an
equilibrium exists where a bubble develops temporarily and eventually bursts.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An asset that is easily exchanged for money can be said to work as a de facto medium
of exchange, just like money itself. In other words, the asset can provide transaction
services. This paper is a theoretical study of the deviation of an asset price from its
fundamental value when the asset can provide transaction services as a medium of ex-
change. The basic idea can be roughly described as follows: Suppose that there exists
a nondepletable asset (land) and that the landowner can obtain money immediately by
borrowing from banks using the land as collateral. If the price of the asset is Qt,i t
can be plausibly assumed that the amount of money the owner of one unit of land can
b o r r o wf r o mab a n ki sw e a k l yi n c r e a s i n gi nQtθt,w h e r eθt (0 ≤ θt < 1) is a parameter
representing the collateral ratio of the asset, which may be exogenously given or may
be an equilibrium outcome determined by the ineﬃciencies of the real estate market.





Pt is the real asset price, Pt is the general price level, and M(·)i saw e a k l y
increasing function. At the same time, the real price of the asset is determined as a
discounted sum of the ﬂow of dividends that the land yields and the ﬂow of the value of





where ys is the present value of the dividend at date s as of date t and gs(Ls)i st h e
present value of the transaction services Ls at date s as of date t.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,l e tu s
focus on the steady state where we can omit time subscripts. In the steady state, the
transaction services L and the real asset price q are determined by
L = M(qθ)a n dq = Q(L), (1)
2where Q(L) is an increasing function of L.A s F i g u r e 1 s h o w s , t h e L∗ that solves (1)
may be positive.
Figure 1. Land prices and the transaction services
Thus, in the equilibrium, the asset may provide a positive amount of transaction services
L∗ and its price may become q∗ = Q(L∗), which is higher than the fundamental price of
the asset Q(0). The diﬀerence Q(L∗)−Q(0) can be regarded as the “bubble” component
of the asset price.1 The bubble is generated by a particular type of externality, or a
self-reference in the transaction services that the asset can provide: An increase in the
asset price results in an increase in the transaction services that the asset can provide,
since the asset is exchangeable for more money; and the increase in transaction services
enhances the value of the asset, causing a further increase in the asset price. Thus the
amount of the transaction services that the asset can provide reﬂects the asset price,
which reﬂects, in turn, the transaction services.
There is a considerable amount of literature on asset-price bubbles (see Camerer
[1989] for a survey of rational growing bubbles, fads, and information bubbles). Exam-
ples of recent theoretical developments are Allen and Gale (2000), in which information
asymmetry and limited liability cause risk-shifting from investors to banks, which leads
to asset-price bubbles; and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003), in which higher order beliefs
under noisy public information generate distortions in asset pricing. But few authors have
addressed the problem of the transaction services that the asset can provide. Among
these few authors are Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Bansal and Coleman (1996).
Kiyotaki and Wright show that a bubble equilibrium exists in which an intrinsically
useless asset (cash) has positive value, since it provides transaction services. The diﬀer-
ence in their model from the present paper is that the amount of transaction services
1To use the word “bubble” in this context may be somewhat misleading, since the diﬀerence Q(L
∗)−
Q(0) reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h ea s s e tp r o v i d e st r a n s a c t i o nservices in addition to the dividends. Thus we
may be able to say that the fundamental price of an asset when it provides transaction services (Q(L
∗))
is higher than its fundamental price when it does not provide transaction services (Q(0)). Nevertheless,
I call the diﬀerence Q(L
∗) − Q(0) a bubble throughout in this paper, since the fundamental price of an
asset usually refers to the value derived from dividends, not from transaction services.
3that the cash can provide in their model is physically limited by the assumption that an
exogenously ﬁxed amount of cash is exchangeable for one unit of goods. Since I assume
that the amount of transaction services that the asset can provide increases as the real
price of the asset increases, the asset price can follow a complicated path, as discussed
in Section 4. Bansal and Coleman analyze a one-period bond as an asset that provides
transaction services. Because their asset is a ﬁxed-payment security with a short ma-
turity, the bubble component generated by the transaction services is small, while in
the present paper the asset is inﬁnitely long-lived and allows the emergence of large and
unstable bubbles.
My model is quite similar to the model in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) in which a bor-
rowing constraint plays a crucial role in determining the asset price. The diﬀerences are
that the labor-supply decision is explicitly introduced2 and that, in Section 4, equilibrium
paths with sticky prices and supply-demand gaps are analyzed.
Introducing the labor supply, I show that if the collateral ratio θ and money supply
m are too small, there exists no equilibrium; that for the middle range of θ and m,t h e r e
exists an equilibrium where the asset price has a bubble component and the resource
allocation is ineﬃcient; and that for a large θ and/or a large m, there exists only the op-
timal equilibrium, where the asset price does not have a bubble component. Introducing
sticky prices and supply-demand gaps, I show that an equilibrium path exists in which
an asset-price bubble develops temporarily and eventually bursts.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, I present the basic
structure of the model, specify the conditions for the existence of steady state equilibria,
and characterize the asset price and eﬃciency of the equilibria. In Section 3, I demond-
trate that there is no other equilibrium than the steady states described in Section 2.
Section 4 examines an equilibrium path under the assumption that prices are sticky and
a temporary supply-demand gap can exist. Under sticky prices, there exist equilibrium
paths in which an asset-price bubble temporarily develops and eventually bursts. Section
2Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) also introduce the labor supply. But in their model where entrepreneurs
and workers are diﬀerent, the agents who supply labor do not invest in capital, while in my model the
representative agent both invest in land and supply labor.
45 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model is a general equilibrium model with a variant of the cash-in-advance con-
s t r a i n t ,w h i c hi sc o m p o s e do fa ni n ﬁnite number of consumers and banks and one gov-
ernment. The economy is populated with a continuum of consumers with identical pref-
erences, whose measure is normalized to one. There is also a continuum of banks with




where β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1), ct is the consumption at date t,a n dlt is the
labor supply at date t. For expositional convenience, the functional form is assumed to
be U(c,l)=l nc + γ ln(1 − l).
At each date t, the consumer is endowed with one unit of time, which can be divided
into labor supply (lt) and leisure (1 − lt). There is a nonperishable asset (land) in this
economy, which has a ﬁxed total supply of 1. Initially each consumer owns 1 unit of land
at the beginning of date 0. I assume that one unit of land yields y units of consumer
goods at each date without any cost, and that one unit of labor yields A units of consumer
goods. Thus the total supply of consumer goods is y + Alt at each date.
At each date t, the government provides Ms
t+1 units of cash to this economy. The
diﬀerence Xt ≡ Ms
t+1 −Ms
t is a lump-sum transfer to (from) the consumer from (to) the
government at date t. (The initial amount Ms
0 is given to consumers at, say, date −1a s
a lump-sum subsidy.)
At each date t, the consumer chooses the amount of consumption ct, the labor supply
lt, cash holdings Mt+1, and land holdings at+1, given that he owns Mt units of cash and
at units of land at the beginning of date t. If we denote the price of cash in terms
of consumer goods by pt and the real land price by qt, the budget constraint for the
consumer at date t is written as
ct + ptMt+1 + qtat+1 ≤ yat + Alt + qtat + pt(Mt + Xt). (3)
5Note that 1
pt is the nominal price of the consumer goods. I assume as in the ordinary
cash-in-advance model that a consumer cannot consume his own products yat +Alt and
needs to buy ct in the goods market from other consumers.
Consumers can buy the goods using cash and intraperiod bank borrowing bt.T h u s ,
consumers must choose ct under the following liquidity constraint:
ct ≤ ptMt + bt.
Banks lend bt to consumers competitively at the beginning of date t, and consumers
repay Rtbt to the banks at the end of date t. As a result of competition among banks,
the rate of return on bank borrowing within one date must be one: Rt = 1. I assume
that bt works as a medium of exchange exactly like cash. In other words, I assume that bt
is given in the form of a bank deposit and that banks can create and provide transaction
services to depositors without cost.
I assume, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), that borrowers can freely abscond, leaving
a part of their land (θat,w h e r e0< θ < 1), and that there is no way for banks to penalize
such borrowers. Therefore, consumers cannot precommit to repay bt to banks, and the
only thing that banks can do when the borrowers abscond is to seize the remaining land
θat. Following the arguments by Kiyotaki and Moore, this assumption implies that a
consumer is subject to the borrowing constraint:
bt ≤ qtθat,
where at is the land held by the consumer and θ (0 ≤ θ < 1) is the collateral ratio.3
Under this borrowing constraint, a consumer who borrows bt will never abscond and will
repay bt at the end of date t, since otherwise the bank will seize a part of his land, the
value of which is qtθat (≥ bt).
3As described below in the timing of events, qt is realized after bank credit is given to the borrowers.
If qt is a random variable at the time of loan contracting, the borrowing constraint must be much more
complicated in form, since it must be derived as the solution of the optimal contracting problem between
agents who have rational expectations toward qt. For simplicity, it is assumed as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) that there is no (aggregate) risk in this economy, so that the future path of the asset price {qt}
∞
t=0
is perfectly foreseen by the agents.
6The above arguments imply that the reduced form of the liquidity constraint for the
consumer is
ct ≤ ptMt + qtθat. (4)
Therefore, the representative consumer’s problem is to maximize (2) subject to (3) and
(4).
Timing of events It is useful to clarify the timing of events. The representative
consumer enters date t with cash holdings Mt and land holdings at. At the beginning of
date t, he produces Alt by supplying labor (lt), he is given yields on the land (yat), and
he borrows bt(= qtθat) from a bank. The goods market opens ﬁrst, and the consumer
sells goods yat + Alt and buys ct under constraint (4). After consumption takes place,
the consumer repays bt to the bank. After repayment, the asset market then opens, and
the consumer buys Mt+1 and at+1 by selling the remaining assets, the real value of which
is yat + Alt + ptMt + qtat − ct.
The equilibrium conditions for cash, land, and consumer goods are
Mt = Ms
t , (5)
at =1 , (6)
ct = yat + Alt. (7)
The competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {pt,q t}∞
t=0 and allocations
{ct,l t,a t,M t}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the following conditions: (a) The prices are nonnegative
and ﬁnite for all t: 0 ≤ pt,q t < ∞; (b) given the prices, the allocations solve the
consumer’s problem (i.e., maximization of [2] subject to [3] and [4]); (c) the allocations
satisfy the equilibrium conditions (5)—(7); and (d) the transversality conditions for cash
and land are satisﬁed.
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers for (3) and (4) by λt and μt, respectively, we ﬁnd that
the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) for the consumer’s problem are
βtUc(t)=λt + μt, (8)
7−βtUl(t)=Aλt, (9)
qtλt = λt+1(y + qt+1)+μt+1qt+1θ, (10)
ptλt = pt+1(λt+1 + μt+1), (11)
where Uc(t)a n dUl(t) are the derivative of U(ct,l t) with respect to ct and lt, respectively.
The transversality conditions can be written as
lim
t→∞qtat+1λt =0 , (12)
lim
t→∞
ptMt{λt + μt} =0 . (13)
Since at = 1 in the equilibrium, the transversality condition for land (12) is satisﬁed
if qt is bounded from above and ct is bounded from below by a positive number. This
transversality condition excludes the rational bubble as an equilibrium price path. It
is easily conﬁrmed that (12) is satisﬁed in the equilibrium paths that are examined in
what follows. In this paper I focus on the case where the government sets the real money
supply (ptMt)a tac o n s t a n tf o ra l lt:
ptMt = m, (14)
where m<A .4 In this case, the transversality condition for money (13) is satisﬁed if ct
is bounded from below by a positive number. It is easily conﬁrmed that (13) is satisﬁed
in the equilibrium paths examined in this paper.









Note that the gross rate of inﬂation is deﬁned as
pt
pt+1,s i n c ept is the inverse of the
nominal price of consumer goods. Note also that since the fundamental price of the
asset (qF




t λt = λt+1(y + qF
t+1). (16)
4Though I assume (14) mainly for analytical simplicity, this assumption seems realistic since the















λt is the real





real present value at t of the transaction services that one unit of cash can provide at
t+1. The second term of the right-hand side of (10) is the real present value at t of the
transaction services that one unit of land can provide at date t +1 .
In what follows in this section, I analyze whether a steady-state equilibrium exists
where resource allocations are constant over time. I characterize the conditions of pa-
rameters θ and m for the existence (or nonexistence) of a type of equilibrium.
2.1 Equilibrium in which the liquidity constraint is nonbinding
First, I characterize the condition for the existence of a steady-state equilibrium where
(4) is not binding, i.e., μt =0f o ra l lt. I hereafter call this equilibrium a “nonbinding
equilibrium.” Setting μt =0f o ra l lt, the FOCs imply that









Since in the nonbinding equilibrium (4) must hold with strict inequality, the condition
for the existence of the nonbinding equilibrium is that Al + y =
A−γy
1+γ + y is less than
β










If and only if parameters m and θ satisfy (17), there exists the unique nonbinding equi-
librium.
In the nonbinding equilibrium, consumption ct is determined by ct = Al + y =
A+y
1+γ ,
and (15) implies that the inﬂation rate is determined by
pt
pt+1 = β.T h u s i f t h e r e a l
money supply is held constant, the price of consumer goods, i.e., 1
pt,m u s tf a l la tt h e
rate of time discount factor in the nonbinding equilibrium. This deﬂation is necessary
for people to hold cash in the equilibrium where μt = 0: Since the transaction services
9that cash can supply are valued at zero, cash needs to have a gross return of no less than
1
β, since otherwise the representative agents will not hold cash as their asset.
2.2 Equilibrium in which the liquidity constraint is binding
Now I characterize the conditions for the existence of a steady-state equilibrium where (4)
is binding, i.e., μt > 0 for all t. I hereafter call this equilibrium a “binding equilibrium.”
The FOCs (8) and (9) imply that μt > 0 is equivalent to
lt < l. (18)
In the binding equilibrium, qt = 1
θ{Alt + y − m}, since the liquidity condition (4) is
binding. Thus lt in the binding equilibrium must satisfy the following condition too,
since qt > 0.
Alt + y − m>0. (19)
Given that lt satisﬁes (18) and (19), the FOC (10) implies that {lt}∞
t=0 in the binding
equilibrium must evolve by L(lt)=R(lt+1), where
L(lt)=














β(Alt + y − m)
Alt + y
. (21)
The condition for the existence of the binding equilibrium where lt = lt+1 = l is that
l satisﬁes (18), (19), and L(l)=R(l). As shown later in this subsection, the exis-
tence of the binding equilibrium is determined by the combinations of L(0)<
>R(0) and
L(l)<
>R(l). Thus I ﬁrst characterize the conditions of parameters for L(0) >R (0) (or

















































































Note that the ﬁrst condition in (23) implies that the numerator of the left-hand side of
the second condition is less than −
γy
A . Since the denominator is negative, the conditions














Note that (24) is exactly the same as (17).
Assuming that the values of A, y, β,a n dγ are ﬁxed, the conditions (22), (23), and
(24) divide the ﬁrst quadrant of (θ, m
y )-space into the following ﬁve regions: Region I,
where L(l) >R (l)a n dL(0) <R (0); Region II, where L(l) >R (l), L(0) >R (0), and
m<y ; Region III, where L(l) <R (l)a n dL(0) <R (0); Region IV, where L(l) <R (l)
and L(0) >R (0); and Region V, where L(l) >R (l), L(0) >R (0), and m>y .N o t et h a t
(22) is satisﬁed in Region II, while (23) is satisﬁed in Region V.
This division of the (θ, m
y )-space is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Division of parameter space
It is shown below that each region corresponds to the existence or nonexistence of
the binding equilibrium. Before proceeding, the following facts must be kept in mind.
Fact 1 Since L(l)=R(l) is a quadratic equation, the number of real and nonnegative
solutions to this equation must be at most two.







1 − θ +
θy
A + y − m
¾
β,
it is the case that 0 < liml→1−
R(l)
L(l) < 1.I no t h e rw o r d s ,L(l) >R (l) for l(< 1) that is
suﬃciently close to 1.
11Now I turn to each region. In Region III, where L(l) <R (l)a n dL(0) <R (0), the
continuity of the functions L(l)a n dR(l) implies that the number of the solutions to
L(l)=R(l) that satisfy 0 <l<l must be an even number: 2j (j =0 ,1,2,···). Fact
2 and the continuity of the functions imply that L(l)=R(l) has at least one solution
which is larger than l. Since the total number of the solutions must be at most two
(Fact 1) and one solution is larger than l, it must be the case that j =0 ,i . e . ,t h e r ei s
no solution to L(l)=R(l)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (18). Therefore, if the parameters are in Region
III, the binding equilibrium does not exist.
In Region I, where L(l) >R (l)a n dL(0) <R (0), the continuity of the functions L(l)
and R(l) implies that the number of the solutions to L(l)=R(l) that satisfy (18) must be
an odd number: 2j +1( j =0 ,1,2,···). Fact 1 implies that the number of the solutions
must be 1. Denoting this solution to L(l)=R(l)b yl∗, I can show as follows that l∗
satisﬁes (19): Note that (19) is equivalent to l>l 0 where l0 is deﬁned by L(l0) = 0; it is
easily shown that R(l0)=
βγ
(1−l0)Ay>0; therefore, L(l0) <R (l0) ;t h es a m er e a s o n i n ga s
for Region III implies that l∗ cannot be less than l0; therefore, l∗ satisﬁes condition (19),
which means that the asset price at the steady state q∗ ≡
Al∗+y−m
θ is positive. It is also
shown as follows that q∗ >q F =
βy
1−β if (19) is satisﬁed.5
Lemma 1 If the parameters are in Region I, it is the case that






where l∗ is the solution to L(l)=R(l).
See the Appendix for the proof. This lemma implies that q∗ >q F if the parameters are
in Region I. Therefore, it has been shown that if the parameters are in Region I, the
binding equilibrium uniquely exists. The inﬂation rate is constant in this equilibrium
5For l
∗ to be the binding equilibrium, it is necessary that the asset price satisﬁes q
∗ >q
F.T h i s
condition is necessary because if the economy is in this steady state the representative agent can obtain
t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fq
F by holding one unit of land forever, and she can also obtain the necessary
transaction services. Therefore, if q
∗ <q
F, the agent never sells the land at q
∗,i m p l y i n gt h a tq
∗ can
never be the equilibrium price of the asset.
12and is determined by (15): The equilibrium rate of inﬂation may be positive or negative,
depending on the values of the parameters.
In Region II, where L(l) >R (l), L(0) >R (0), and m<y , the continuity of the
functions L(l)a n dR(l) implies that the number of the solutions to L(l)=R(l)t h a t
satisfy (18) must be an even number: 2j (j =0 ,1,2,···). The equation L(l)=R(l)c a n
be rewritten as G(l)=H(l), where
G(l)={1 − (1 − θ)β}
γ
Aθ
(Al + y − m)(Al + y), (26)
H(l)=β(Al + y − m)(1 − l)+
βγy
A
(Al + y). (27)




A , are both negative numbers.







that G(l)=H(l) has at most one positive solution. Meanwhile, the positive solutions
to G(l)=H(l) must be equal to the positive solutions to L(l)=R(l), the number of
which is an even number. Therefore, the number of the solutions to L(l)=R(l)i nt h e
region 0 <l<l is zero. This shows that if the parameters are in Region II, the binding
equilibrium does not exist.
In Region IV, where L(l) <R (l)a n dL(0) >R (0), the continuity of the functions
L(l)a n dR(l)i m p l i e st h a tL(l)=R(l) has at least one solution that satisﬁes 0 <l<l.
Fact 2 implies that L(l)=R(l) has at least one solution that is larger than l.S i n c et h e
total number of the solutions must be at most two (Fact 1), it is the case that L(l)=R(l)
has one solution l∗
4 in the region where 0 <l<l and the other solution in the region
where l<l<1. It is shown as follows that the solution l∗
4 is not the equilibrium: As
shown in the reasoning for Region I, l0,t h es o l u t i o nt oL(l) = 0, satisﬁes L(l0) <R (l0);
the continuity of L(l)a n dR(l)i m p l i e st h a tl∗
4 <l 0;t h e r e f o r e ,l∗
4 does not satisfy (19),
meaning that l∗
4 is not the equilibrium. This shows that if the parameters are in Region
IV, the binding equilibrium does not exist.
Finally, in Region V, where L(l) >R (l), L(0) >R (0), and m>y ,t h ec o n t i n u i t y
of the functions L(l)a n dR(l) implies that the number of the solutions to L(l)=R(l)
that satisfy (18) must be an even number: 2j (j =0 ,1,2,···). Since m>y ,o n er o o t
13of G(l) = 0, i.e.,
m−y







A implies that G(l)=H(l) has at least one positive
solution. Meanwhile, the positive solutions to G(l)=H(l) must be equal to the positive
solutions to L(l)=R(l), the number of which is an even number. Therefore, the number
of the solutions to L(l)=R(l) in the region 0 <l<l is two. Let us denote these
solutions by l∗
51 and l∗
52,w h e r e0<l ∗
51 <l ∗
52. A similar argument as for Region I implies
that 0 = L(l0) <R (l0), where l0 =
m−y
A > 0. Therefore, the continuity of L(l)a n dR(l)
implies that 0 <l ∗
51 <l 0 <l ∗
52, and thus, L(l∗
51) < 0 <L (l∗
52). Since this result means
that the asset price is negative if l = l∗
51,t h eﬁrst solution l∗
51 is not the equilibrium
allocation of labor supply. On the other hand, since the same lemma as Lemma 1 holds
for l∗
52, it is the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, if the parameters are in Region V, the
binding equilibrium uniquely exists.
2.3 Discussion
Summing up the results in the previous subsections, we can say the following for the
existence of the equilibria: If the parameters are in Region I or V, the binding equilibrium
exists and the nonbinding equilibrium does not exist; In Region III or IV, the binding
equilibrium does not exist and the nonbinding equilibrium exists; In Region II, there
exists no equilibrium. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Regions for the existence of equilibria
Note that in the nonbinding equilibrium, the resource allocation is eﬃcient: The
eﬃcient allocation is deﬁned as the solution to maxct,lt
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct,l t) subject to ct ≤
Alt+y. This allocation is realized in the nonbinding equilibrium. It has been shown that
if the parameters satisfy (24), i.e., m and/or θ are suﬃciently large, there exists only the
optimal (nonbinding) equilibrium. This leads to the following (trivial) intuition: If the
amount of transaction services that cash (Mt) and land (at) can supply is suﬃciently large
so that the amount supplied exceeds that needed, the liquidity constraint (4) becomes
nonbinding and the resource allocation becomes eﬃcient.
14In the binding equilibrium, the resource allocation is ineﬃcient: If the parameters
are in Region I or V, the labor supply in the binding equilibrium is strictly less than the
ﬁr s tb e s tv a l u el.
Note also that even in the case that m = 0, the nonbinding or binding equilibrium
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(1+γ)y, there exists only the nonbinding equilibrium.
Since in this economy land works as “commodity money” that can loosen the liquidity
constraint (4), the ﬁat money m may not be necessary in an equilibrium. Figure 3 shows
that this is exactly the case.
The same argument holds for ﬁat money. In the case that θ = 0, the nonbinding
or binding equilibrium can exist depending on the value of m:I fy<m<
A+y
1+γ ,t h e r e
exists only the binding equilibrium, and if m>
A+y
1+γ , there exists only the nonbinding
equilibrium. Therefore, if a suﬃcient amount of ﬁat money is supplied, the ﬁxed asset
(land) need not play the role of commodity money in the equilibrium.
Since in the analysis in this paper it is assumed that the agents hold both ﬁat and
commodity monies, the equilibrium inﬂation rate is determined so that rational agents
are willing to have both monies. The nominal supply of cash Mt is determined passively
in the equilibrium of this model so that Mt is consistent with the equilibrium inﬂation
rate. If we assume that the monetary authority ﬁxes the inﬂation rate or the nominal
amount of cash M instead of the real money balance m,w ew i l lﬁnd that for a large
θ, the commodity money at dominates the ﬁat money Mt. This is one of the results
in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001): They show that in their model, if θ is large and the
(nominal) supply of ﬁat money Mt is ﬁxed, ﬁat money is valued at zero, and only the
physical asset (i.e., land in my model) plays the role of money in the equilibrium. Fiat
money becomes useless paper in such an equilibrium.
In my model, it is demonstrated that the eﬃciency of the equilibrium (i.e., whether it
is binding or nonbinding) is not directly determined by the existence or nonexistence of
ﬁat money m. What is relevant to the eﬃciency is the total amount of transaction services
that is provided by ﬁat and commodity monies (m + qtθat). If this amount is small, the
15equilibrium becomes binding and ineﬃcient, and if this amount is large, the equilibrium
becomes nonbinding and eﬃcient. In other words, if the value of the transaction services
that the asset can provide, i.e., μt, is high, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, and if it is
zero, the equilibrium is eﬃcient. Figure 4 shows that the asset price q∗ is higher than
the fundamental price qF in the binding equilibrium and that it converges to qF as
the equilibrium becomes nonbinding. In this ﬁgure, the parameters are set as follows:
β =0 .98, γ =2 ,A =1 ,a n dy =0 .02. The upper panel shows the case where m
y is ﬁxed
at 1.5, and the lower panel shows the case where θ is ﬁxed at 0.2.
Figure 4. Equilibrium asset prices
Another point that my model shows is that if m and θ are too small so that the
parameters fall in Region II, no equilibrium exists in this economy. We can intuitively
grasp this as follows. In the case where the parameters are in Region II, the asset price
that satisﬁes (4) today is too expensive for a buyer, compared to the return from the asset
that he will get tomorrow if the economy stays at a steady state lt = l,w h e r e0<l<l.
Therefore, the labor supply tommorrow lt+1 must be larger than today in order to justify
qt. Thus, there is no steady state equilibrium. A caveat for this nonexistence result is
that Region II may be negligibly small for plausible parameter values. Suppose, for
example, that β =0 .98, γ =2 ,A =1 ,a n dy =0 .02. In this case, since (23) must be
satisﬁed in Region II, θ in Region II is smaller than 0.0009. Since a realistic value of θ
is probably in the range between 0.1a n d0 .8, Region II is negligibly small. Therefore,
the nonexistence of an equilibrium for Region II may not be a relevant result for actual
economies.
Implications for monetary policy The above results imply that the real money
supply m must be suﬃciently large in order to realize the social optimum (the nonbinding
equilibrium), while the inﬂation rate must be set at a negative value (i.e.,
pt
pt+1 = β).
Therefore, the optimal monetary policy in this model is the Friedman’s rule, i.e., to set
the level of the real balance at a suﬃciently large value and to reduce the nominal money
supply gradually. The results also indicate that it may be inappropriate to interpret the
16discrepancy q∗−qF in the binding equilibrium as the asset-price bubble. This is because
the model shows that the discrepancy becomes large when the money supply m is small.
In reality, the emergence of asset-price bubbles is usually associated with expansion of
money and credit (see Allen and Gale [2000]). It may be necessary to consider a diﬀerent
factor, such as the risk-shifting eﬀect in Allen and Gale (2000), in order to explain the
bubbles associated with monetary expansion.
3 On deviation from the steady state equilibrium
If the parameters are in Regions III and IV, the economy always stays in the nonbinding
equilibrium, in which the allocations of labor and consumption are constant over time.
In this section I assume that the parameters are in Region I or V, and examine whether
there is any equilibrium path that is not the steady state, i.e., the binding equilibrium.
The goal of this section is to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If the parameters are in Region I or V, no equilibrium path exists other than
the binding equilibrium.
This lemma conﬁrms that in the model of this paper, in which there is no capital accu-
mulation or productivity growth, an equilibrium path is always a steady state.
(Proof of Lemma 2)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is an equilibrium path other than the
binding equilibrium. Since the nonbinding equilibrium in which μt =0f o ra l lt does
not exist for the parameters in Region I or V, one of the following three must be true in
this equilibrium path: (i) μt > 0 for all t;( i i )t h e r ee x i s t ss o m et, such that μt > 0a n d
μt+k =0f o ra l lk ≥ 1; or (iii) there exists some t, such that μt = 0 and μt+1 > 0. If (i) is
true, the labor supply lt in this equilibrium path must be determined by L(lt)=R(lt+1).
Denote the solution to L(l)=R(l)b yl∗. Fact 2 implies that if l0 >l ∗, lt eventually
exceeds l, and thus the condition μt > 0i sv i o l a t e d . I fl0 <l ∗, lt or L(lt)e v e n t u a l l y
becomes less than zero. Therefore, (i) is not true in the equilibrium path. It is obvious
that (ii) cannot be true, since otherwise this equilibrium is identical to the nonbinding
17equilibrium from t + 1 onward, which cannot exist for the parameters in Region I or V.
Therefore, (iii) must be true if this equilibrium path exists. Note that in this event (iii),
the labor at t+1 must satisfy (18). Since μt = 0, the FOCs imply that lt = l.T h eF O C
(10) implies that
qt
Al+y = R(lt+1), since
γ
(1−l)A = 1
Al+y. Meanwhile, since μt =0 ,t h e
liquidity constraint (4) is not binding at t.T h u s ,qt >
Al+y−m






Al + y − m
(Al + y)θ
= L(l). (28)
Since L(l)a n dR(l) are both continuous and increasing functions and L(l) >R (l), (28)
implies that lt+1 > l. Therefore, lt+1 does not satisfy (18), meaning that the event
(iii) cannot occur in the equilibrium. Since neither of (i), (ii), or (iii) can occur in an
equilibrium, there is no equilibrium other than the binding equilibrium. (End of proof)
The results of this and the previous sections imply that in this model the economy
always stays in a steady state, i.e., either the binding equilibrium or the nonbinding
equilibrium, unless the parameters are in Region II, where neither of them exists.
4 Equilibrium with sticky prices and bursting bubbles
The arguments in the previous section imply that only the steady states are the equilib-
rium in the case where prices are ﬂexible and there is no supply-demand gap.
If we introduce sticky prices and allow the existence of a supply-demand gap, there
may be various equilibrium paths, in which the evolution of the asset price looks like
the formation and bursting of a bubble. In this section, it is demonstrated that such an
equilibrium path exists.
The parameters are assumed to be in Region I or V in what follows. It is shown that
if the equilibrium condition ct = Alt+y is relaxed to ct ≤ Alt+y and prices are sticky in
the sense that pt and qt are predetermined at date t − 2a n dt h ep r i c e sa td a t e s0a n d1
(p0, q0, p1,a n dq1) are appropriately given, then for appropriate parameters there exist
equilibria in which a bubble develops temporarily and bursts at some date.
18First, the following fact is easily conﬁrmed:
Fact 3 Assume that the market clearing condition ct = Alt + y is satisﬁed at dates 0
and 1. To preﬁx the prices at dates 0 and 1 (p0, q0, p1,a n dq1) at appropriate values is
equivalent to preﬁxing the labor supply at date 0 (l0).
Since we are considering a equilibrium path in which μt > 0, l1 is determined by L(l0)=
R(l1), implying that l1 and c1 are functions of l0. Thus, the right-hand side of equation
(15) for t = 0 is a function of l0. This equation implies that to preﬁxt h ei n ﬂation rate
at date 0 (
p0
p1)i se q u i v a l e n tt op r e ﬁxing l0. The asset prices q0 and q1 must be given at
consistent values, i.e., q0 =
Al0+y−m
θ and q1 =
Al1+y−m
θ .
In order to characterize such an equilibrium, it is necessary to relax the deﬁnition of
a competitive equilibrium to allow for a temporary supply-demand gap:
Deﬁnition 2 A sticky price equilibrium is the same as a competitive equilibrium deﬁned
by Deﬁnition 1, except for that (a) prices pt and qt are predetermined at date t − 2;( b )
instead of (7), ct ≤ Alt + y is satisﬁed; and (c) if ct <A l t + y, the supply-demand gap
(Alt + y − ct) perishes without being consumed by anyone at date t and is borne as a
lump-sum cost by the consumer (= seller), and the budget constraint for the consumer
at date t becomes
ct + ptMt+1 + qtat+1 ≤ Alt + yat + qtat + pt(Mt + Xt) − δt, (29)
where δt is a lump-sum cost, which is exogenous for the consumer, and δt = Alt + y − ct
holds in the equilibrium.
The prices at date t are predetermined at t−2, and the consumer (=seller) cannot change
the price pt at date t even though he cannot sell all of his goods at pt. Note that even
under sticky prices, the FOCs: (8)—(11) must be satisﬁed, since the consumers solve
their optimization problem taking the entire price path as given. Therefore, the FOCs
are always satisﬁed in a sticky price equilibrium, while the market clearing conditions
may not be. This implies that if the market clearing conditions are satisﬁed for t and
t + 1 in the sticky price equilibrium, the equation L(lt)=R(lt+1)m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed.
19The concept of sticky price equilibrium is useful for analyzing the situation where the
initial value of the labor supply l0 is not l∗. (If prices are not sticky, p0, q0, p1,a n dq1
adjust instantaneously at date 0 so that l0 never deviates from l∗.) If l0 >l ∗ and prices
are sticky, the equilibrium path, or lt, is determined by the diﬀerence equation L(lt)=
R(lt+1) for the time being, but the equation becomes impossible to solve eventually, since
lt must be less than l in the equilibrium where μt > 0. It is shown as follows that if the
parameters satisfy a certain condition, there exists a sticky price equilibrium where the
bubble bursts at some date τ and there emerges a supply-demand gap: cτ <A l τ + y.
4.1 A bubble path with the binding liquidity constraint















It is graphically conﬁrmed that equation (30) has only one solution that is larger than m.
The parameter c is a function of θ and m
y .U s i n gc, the following condition determines a

































Lemma 3 Suppose that the parameters are in Region I or V and that they also satisfy
(31), (33), and (34). Suppose also that the initial value of the labor supply l0 is ﬁxed
and that it exceeds l∗. There exists a sticky price equilibrium where at =1and μt > 0
20for all t,a n d∃τ is such that l∗ <l t < l for t<τ, lt = l∗ for t>τ, cτ <A l τ + y,a n d
ct = Alt + y for t 6= τ.
The region of the parameters that satisfy the assumptions of this lemma is illustrated in
Figure 5. The ﬁxed parameters are set at the same values as those in Figure 4. In this
case Region II is negligibly small. This ﬁgure implies that the equilibrium path described
in this lemma exists if m
y is very small.
Figure 5. Region for the existence of a bubble path with μτ > 0
(Proof) Proof is by construction. I construct an equilibrium where the economy jumps
to the binding equilibrium (where lt = l∗) at date τ +1 . D e ﬁne ˜ l by L(˜ l)=R(l).
The sequence {l0,l 1,···,l τ−1} is constructed by L(lt)=R(lt+1)( t =0 ,1,···,τ − 2)
and lτ−2 < ˜ l ≤ lτ−1. It is easily conﬁrmed graphically that lτ−1 < l. The sequence ct
(t =0 ,1,···,τ − 1)i sa l s od e ﬁned by ct = Alt + y. Since it is assumed that μτ > 0, the
asset price at τ must satisfy qτ = cτ−m




















Equations (35) and (36) are two equations for two unknowns: cτ and lτ. These equations















Since ˜ l<l τ−1 < l and L(l)i si n c r e a s i n gi nl,i ti sc o n ﬁrmed graphically that the solution
to (37) satisﬁes c<c τ <c 0.I no r d e rf o rcτ and lτ to be the equilibrium allocations, they




which is rewritten using (36) as
θL(l∗)cτ
cτ−m < 1. Since cτ >c , this condition is satisﬁed if c





A. This condition is satisﬁed for cτ <c 0 if c0 satisﬁes (33). Finally,
21the condition cτ <A l τ+y is equivalent to cτ <
(A+y)θL(l∗)+γm
γ+θL(l∗) . This condition is satisﬁed
if the parameters satisfy (34), since c<c τ <c 0. Therefore, cτ and lτ are the equilibrium
allocations. For t ≥ τ + 1, the allocations are deﬁned by lt = l∗ and ct = c∗ = Al∗ + y.
The asset price is determined by qt = ct−m
θ for all t, and (the inverse of) the general price
is determined by (15). Note that qt in this equilibrium always exceeds the fundamental
price qF
t that is deﬁned by (16) for the allocations of this equilibrium: This is because
μt > 0 for all t in this equilibrium path and qt satisﬁes (10). (End of proof)
This lemma implies that there exists a sequence of prices {pt,q t}∞
t=0 that support the
above sequence {ct,l t}∞
t=0 as the resource allocation in a sticky price equilibrium.
Note that this is not the unique sticky price equilibrium for a given initial value
(l0). The bubble may burst at some time that is less than or equal to τ deﬁned above.
There may be a sticky price equilibrium that corresponds to each timing of the bubble’s
puncturing. The timing τ in the above lemma is the upper limit for continuation of the
bubble when the initial labor supply is given as l0 >l ∗.
One example of the equilibrium path described in Lemma 3 is shown in Figure 6. The
equilibrium path corresponds to θ =0 .2a n dm
y =0 .01. Consumption and the asset price
rise gradually, and they collapse at date τ. The labor supply also rises gradually, and it
jumps up at date τ. This jump of labor at the bubble’s collapse may be interpreted as
a boom in the real sector that is stimulated by the last stage of the asset-price bubble
of τ − 1. An interesting feature of this simulation is the inﬂation rate. It goes down
gradually during the period when the asset price and consumption continue rising. The
inﬂation rate jumps up at τ −1 and down to severe deﬂation at τ.T h es l o w i n gi n ﬂation
during the period of the asset-price bubble seems consistent with the observations in
Japan during the late 1980s: In that period, inﬂation did not accelerate, while stock
prices and land prices skyrocketed; this steady inﬂation was one reason why the Bank of
Japan decided not to respond preemptively.
Figure 6. A bubble path with μτ > 0
224.2 A bubble path with the nonbinding liquidity constraint
It is also shown in the following lemma that for appropriate parameter values there exists
a sticky price equilibrium in which the bursting of the bubble occurs and μt = 0 at the



















Lemma 4 Suppose that the parameters are in Region I or V and that they also satisfy
(38), (39), and (40). Suppose also that the initial value of labor supply l0 is ﬁxed and
exceeds l∗. A sticky price equilibrium exists where at =1 ,a n d∃τ is such that l∗ <l t < l
for t<τ, lt = l∗ for t>τ, cτ <A l τ + y, ct = Alt + y for t 6= τ, μt > 0 for ∀t 6= τ,a n d
μτ =0 .
The region of the parameters that satisfy the assumptions of this lemma is illustrated
in Figure 7. The ﬁxed parameters are set at the same values as those in Figure 4. This
ﬁgure implies that the equilibrium path described in this lemma exists for a wide range
of θ and m
y .(Region II is negligibly small in this ﬁgure.) Thus, this lemma may hold for
realistic parameter values.
Figure 7. Region for the existence of a bubble path with μτ =0
(Proof) Proof is by construction. I construct an equilibrium where the economy jumps
to the binding equilibrium at date τ +1. The sequence {l0,l 1,···,l τ−1} is constructed by
L(lt)=R(lt+1)( t =0 ,1,···,τ −2) and lτ−2 < ˜ l ≤ lτ−1. It is easily conﬁrmed graphically
that lτ−1 < l. The sequence ct (t =0 ,1,···,τ −1)i sa l s od e ﬁned by ct = Alt +y.S i n c e





























qτ = cτL(l∗). (46)
The condition for lτ > 0i st h a t1>
βγy
{L(lτ−1)−βL(l∗)}A,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed if the parameters
satisfy (39), since lτ−1 > ˜ l and L(˜ l)=R(l). The condition for μτ =0i sqτθ + m>c τ,
which is rewritten as m
y >
{1−L(l∗)θ}β
L(lτ−1)−βL(l∗). This condition is satisﬁed if the parameters
satisfy (38), since lτ−1 < l.S i n c e lτ and cτ are determined by the above equations,




1+γ . This condition is
satisﬁed if (40) is satisﬁed, since L(lτ) >R (l). Therefore, if the parameters satisfy the
assumptions of this lemma, there exists a sticky price equilibrium in which the bubble
bursts at τ and the economy jumps to the binding equilibrium at τ + 1. (End of proof)
One example of the equilibrium path described in Lemma 4 is shown in Figure 8.
The equilibrium path corresponds to θ =0 .2a n dm
y =1 .5. The behaviors of variables
are qualitatively the same as those in Figure 6.
Figure 8. A bubble path with μτ =0
4.3 Discussion
In the previous subsections it is demonstrated that sticky price equilibrium exists in
which the asset price rises temporarily and collapses eventually. Similarly, it can be
shown that for appropriate parameters an equilibrium path exists in which the asset
24price falls temporarily following L(lt)=R(lt+1)w i t hl0 <l ∗, and jumps up to the steady
state value eventually. Similar lemmas as Lemmas 3 and 4 can be established for the
negative bubble paths.
Note that in the previous subsections it is implicitly assumed that the agents’ expec-
tations are well coordinated, such that the economy eventually jumps to the steady state
(i.e., the binding or nonbinding equilibrium). Depending on the expectations on the
jump at date τ, the economy may follow a much more complicated path. For example, it
is possible that the rise and collapse of the asset price will be repeated cyclically; or that
the economy may follow a positive bubble path for several periods, jump to a negative
bubble path for subsequent periods, and jump again to the steady state or a positive or
negative bubble path.
What has been shown in this section is that if sticky prices are assumed and a supply-
demand gap is allowed, the model can exhibit rich dynamics in which the asset price,
labor supply, and consumption change over time and jump sometimes.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has examined the equilibrium of an economy with a nondepletable asset (i.e.,
land) in the case where the asset can provide transaction services, using a variant of
the cash-in-advance model. The transaction services the asset can provide increase as
its (real) price becomes higher, since the owner of the asset can borrow more money by
putting it up as collateral. Thus the asset price may exceed its fundamental price, since
the transaction services that it can provide are an increasing function of the asset price,
which reﬂects the value of the transaction services that it can provide.
Introducing a parameter that represents the collateral ratio of the asset (θ), I showed
that if the total supply of transaction services (qθa + m) is small, the equilibrium is
ineﬃcient and the asset price exceeds its fundamental price, and that if qθa+m is large,
the equilibrium is eﬃcient and the asset price equals its fundamental price. It was also
shown that if the equilibrium concept is relaxed to allow for sticky prices and a temporary
supply-demand gap, there exists an equilibrium in which a bubble develops temporarily
25and eventually bursts.
6A p p e n d i x
In this appendix, I show a mathematical proof of Lemma 1 and describe the economic
intuition behind it:
(Proof of Lemma 1)











Since the parameters are in Region I, the above condition is satisﬁed if and only if




1−β, we can rewrite the condition L(l) <R (l)
as














Comparing this condition and (24), it is easily conﬁrmed that this condition is satisﬁed
if the parameters are in Region I. (End of proof)
The intuition of this lemma is as follows. Since (19) is satisﬁed, both L(lt)a n dR(lt)
are positive. Since equation L(lt)=R(lt+1) is equivalent to (10), it can be said that q∗
satisﬁes the FOC (10). On the other hand, qF satisﬁes (16). Since l∗ < l,i ti st h ec a s e
that μt > 0f o rlt = l∗ and ct = Al∗ + y. Therefore, equations (10) and (16) imply that
q∗ >q F. In other words, since the value of the transaction services that the asset can
provide is positive, the actual asset price q∗ is larger than its fundamental price qF as
long as (19) is satisﬁed.
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Region for a bubble 




time Labor  Consumption Asset  price π  
1  0.31186  0.33186  1.6583  1.0152 
2  0.31213  0.33213  1.6597  1.0138 
3  0.31248  0.33248  1.6614  1.0119 
4  0.31292  0.33292  1.6636  1.0096 
5  0.31348  0.33348  1.6664  1.0066 
6  0.31419  0.33419  1.67  1.0029 
7  0.31509  0.33509  1.6744  0.99816 
8  0.31622  0.33622  1.6801  0.99227 
9  0.31766  0.33766  1.6873  0.98489 
10  0.31947  0.33947  1.6964  38.57 
11(τ )  0.9824  0.008646  0.042228  0.029659 
12(τ +1)  0.31084  0.33084  1.6532  1.0207 

































π Figure 7. Region for the existence of a bubble path with  0 = τ μ  
 















Region for a bubble path 
with  0 = τ μ  Figure 8. A bubble path with  0 = τ μ  
 
 
time Labor  Consumption Asset  price π  
1  0.31302 0.33302  1.5151  1.0101 
2  0.31325 0.33325  1.5163  1.0089 
3  0.31354 0.33354  1.5177  1.0073 
4  0.31391 0.33391  1.5196  1.0054 
5  0.31437 0.33437  1.5218 1.003 
6  0.31494 0.33494  1.5247  1.0001 
7  0.31565 0.33565  1.5283  0.9964 
8  0.31654 0.33654  1.5327  0.99185 
9  0.31765 0.33765  1.5382  0.98622 
10  0.31903 0.33903  1.5451  3.9981 
11(τ )  0.83308 0.083459 0.36646  0.28004 
12(τ +1)  0.31207 0.33207  1.5103  1.0151 
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